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The U.K. Central Electricity Generating Board is 
considering the site for Britain's first Pressurised 
Water Reactor (P.W.R.) while the Nuclear Installations 
Inspectorate has claimed that the design of the British 
P.W.R. would be different from that of the stricken 
Three Mile Island No 2 Reactor, near Harrisburg (Penn-
sylvania). Following the Harrisburg accident, earlier 
thia year, four more nuclear power stations in the 
United States have been closed down as a result of 
dangerous mishaps. Meanwhile, the opening of new -
P.W.R. power stations at Gravelines and Tricasting in 
France has been prevented due to the action of the 
trade unions who revealed the discovery of cracks 
detected in key components of both plants. In addition, 
progress on the construction of certain P.W.R.'s in 
the German Federal Republec has been held up pending 
. I. 
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the outcome of legal action. 
1. Will the Commission explain what differences in design of the 
British P.W.R. would prevent the possibility of a Harrisburg-
type accident? 
2. Does the Commission consider that the current design of 
P.W.R.•s manufactured by Framatome/Creusot-Loire and Siemens 
(K.W.U.) would similarly prevent a Harrisburg-type accident 
and, if so, why? 
3. Does the Commission not accept that nuclear reactors with 
single-phase cooling systems based, for example, on carbon 
dioxide gas, are inherently safer than those with two-phase 
water cooling systems operating under very high pressure? 
4. To What extent does the Commission consider that the cracks 
discovered in the Gravelines and Tricastin reactors constitute 
a risk to their safe operation and will the Commission consider 
making representations to the French Government so as to 
ensure the well-being of the nearby population (given 
especially the proximity of Gravelines to the Belgian fron-
tier)? 
5. Will the Commission state why it has been necessary to extend 
. 
until 31 May 1980 the term of ,office of the group of high-
level independent experts whose task is to review the overall 
current position regarding nuclear safety in the Community 
in the light of the Harrisburg accident, 1 in view of the 
undertaking given by Vice-President Natali to Parliament on 
9 May 1979 that this group 11will'submit a report to the 
2 Commission by the end of the year .. ? 
6. Does the Commission not consider that it is the duty of the 
Governments of the Member States to inform the public of 
any safety problems which arise in nuclear installations 
(1) 
(2) 
' and is the commission prepared to assume such a responsibility 
in case of default? 
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